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The Alienation of Americans
from their Public Schools
Ned Fuller*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Religion and public education are perhaps the two most
pervasive facets of American life. The Supreme Court has
consistently interpreted the First Amendment to mean that
these two areas should not intersect. The difficulty is in the
application of the First Amendment to everyday life.
Unfortunately, yet understandably, the Supreme Court has
complicated this process by failing to give an exact definition of
religion. Such a definition may be impossible to ascertain. A
definition too broad excludes much of what is necessary to a
viable society and leads to anarchy; a definition too narrow
constrains the conscience of one person while establishing the
religion of another. America's pluralistic nature accentuates
this problem. This paper will analyze the Court's attempts at
resolving the delicate balance of maintaining an effective public
school system that neither alienates nor establishes one
religious group over another.
In order to understand a public school system's
effectiveness, one must first know what a public school system
should effect, thus, part II of this paper will discuss the
purposes of public schools and how the Supreme Court has
applied the Establishment Clause to help accomplish those
purposes. Part III will analyze the federal courts' application of
the Establishment Clause in the context of classroom
curriculum, bible reading and school prayer. Additionally, Part
III will address the effectiveness of the federal court's approach
concluding that the court's failure to adequately define religion
has not prevented the establishment of religion, has alienated a
segment of society and has failed to assist the schools in
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accomplishing their primary objectives. Part IV of this paper
will discuss how to improve on the Court's analyses. This
section will suggest that because defining religion is so
difficult, the Court should revise what constitutes
establishment and incorporate a coercion standard such as that
used in freedom of speech analyses.

II. THE PURPOSE OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE.

One of the most important goals of the public school
system is to provide societal cohesion. The Supreme Court has
stated that the public school system is "the most pervasive
means for promoting our common destiny." 1 The difficulty is in
defining that destiny. During the Colonial period of American
history, there existed a common assumption that the purpose of
life was to promote Christian faith. 2 It is not surprising,
therefore, to find that the first form of public schools in
America originated in Massachusetts for the purpose of
assisting children in learning to read the Bible. 3 The
legislation requiring the establishment of these first schools
stated:
It being one chief project of the old deluder, Satan to keep
man from the knowledge of the Scriptures .... It is therefore
ordered, that every township in this jurisdiction, after the
Lord hath increased them to the number of fifty householders,
shall then forthwith appoint one within their town to teach
all such children as shall resort to him to write and read ...
and it is further ordered, that where any town shall increase
to the number of one hundred families or householders they
shall set up a grammar school. 4

Beginning with these first public schools and into the
Eighteenth Century, public and private schools taught from a
religious perspective, 5 apparently to promote a common

1. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948)
(opinion of J. Frankfurter) (cited with approval in Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S.
578, 584 (1987)).
2. ROCKNE MCCARTHY, et al., SOCIETY, STATE AND SCHOOLS 80 (1981)
[hereinafter SOCIETY].
3. !d.
4. R. MCMILLAN, REUGION IN THE PUBUC ScHOOLS 78-9 (1984) (footnote
omitted).
5. C. MOEHLMAN, SCHOOL AND CHURCH: THE AMERICAN WAY 28 (2 ed. 1944);
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destiny of Christian conversion. Thus, there was no reason to
distinguish public and private schools in the administration of
public funds. The rationale was that private schools provided a
public service to the community.
Mter the Revolutionary War, however, the sense of
common destiny and the purpose of public schooling began to
change. The public educational system was seen as a way to
instill and develop those characteristics necessary to perpetuate
and advance a democratic society. The First Congress passed
the Northwest Ordinance which stated in article three,
"[r ]eligion, morality and knowledge being necessary to a good
government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the
means of education shall forever be encouraged."6 The
Northwest Ordinance evidences the subtle, yet, important shift
from schooling for spiritual growth purposes to schooling for
civil stability purposes.
This change may have resulted from the pragmatic effect of
pluralism. The new states recognized the need for religious
instruction but were hesitant to allow the tenets of "other
sects" to be taught. 7 R. Freeman Butts, as reported by
McMillan, observes:
With few exceptions the major Protestant denominations
turned more and more to the idea of a nonsectarian common
school. This was sometimes the result of weariness with
sectarian ideological disputes, sometimes in recognition of the
added expense of independent denominational effort,
sometimes of the need for counteraction against the Catholic
threat, and sometimes of a genuine belief in the priority of
political community as the goal of training in common
citizenship. 8

Thus the pragmatic effect of pluralism was that the needs and
desires of each sect would negate the other. If religious
indoctrination remained the sole aim of education, the public
schools, failing to agree on one sect, would fail. However, as the
Northwest Ordinance evidences, the religious aim of schooling
was replaced, at least to some degree, with the aim of

see James E. Woods, Jr., Religion and the Public Scfwols, 1986 B.Y.U. L.
(1986).
6. ADLER, E'l' AL., THE ANNALS OF AMERICA, 3:194-5 (1968).
7. MCMILLAN, supra note 4 at 81.
8. ld. at 82.

REV. 349
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promoting democratic principles. Thus schooling was seen as a
means of preserving a common destiny of self-government.
Promoting democratic principles did not mean that religion
needed to be absolutely excluded. Instead, religion was viewed
as a necessary component of "good government." Moreover,
schooling was seen as a means of transferring religion, as well
as morality and knowledge, in order to maintain a "good
government and the happiness of mankind."9 Religion's
necessity to a good government is reflected in Benjamin
Franklin's words:
But think how great a Proportion of Mankind consists of
weak and ignorant Men and Women, and of inexperienc'd and
inconsiderate Youth of both Sexes, who have need of the
Motives of Religion to restrain them from Vice, to support
their Virtue and retain them in the practice of it until it
becomes habitual, which is the great Point for its Security
.... If men are so wicked as we now see them with religion,
what would they be without it. 10

Likewise, George Washington concluded that, "[o]f all the
dispositions and habits, which lead to political prosperity,
religion and morality are indispensable supports. . . . It is
substantially true, that virtue or morality is a necessary spring
of popular government." 11 John Adams added, "[o]ur
Constitution was made only for a moral and religious people. It
is wholly inadequate to the government of any other." 12
Finally, Thomas .Jefferson posed this query: "Can the liberties
of a nation be thought secure when we have removed their only
firm basis, a conviction in the minds of the people that these
liberties are the gift of God? That they are not to be violated
but with His wrath?" 13
Indeed, the importance of religion is not lost on those
battling for the public school curriculum. As the sense of
society's destiny changed, few, if any, advocated the complete
eradication of religion from the public schools. A more accurate
characterization of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century
debates regarding public school curriculum is that the

9. ADLER, supra note 6.
10. RICHARD VE'ITERLI AND GARY BRYNER, IN SEARCH OF THE REPUBLIC 69
(1987) (emphasis in the original) (footnote omitted).
11. ld. at 69-70.
12. Id. at 70.
13. ld. at 105.
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nonsectarian goal was to loosen the sectarian control over the
public schools. One commentator has noted that Horace Mann,
a stalwart supporter of nonsectarian schools, "approved of Bible
reading and other nonsectarian religious exercises in the public
school." 14 Mueller continues,
[t]he McGuffey Readers, which for so long set the tone of
public-school education, were almost sermonic in style and
content. The public school teacher was expected to be as much
an exemplar of morality as was the clergyman. It was
common practice to recruit public school teachers and
administrators from among graduates of seminaries and
denominational colleges. 15

Though the common destiny had changed from that of creating
Zion to that of ensuring democracy, religion's role in the public
schools, while no longer central, was universally recognized.
Hindsight clarifies the debate over public school
curriculum. On the one hand, most, if not all, agree that
education is necessary to the progress of a democratic society.
Additionally, most, if not all, agree that some moral cohesion is
also necessary to democratic stability and this moral cohesion
can be found among the rudiments of religion. Yet, if religion is
to be taught, what religious morals, or whose religious tenets
are necessary to the overall cohesion of society? As a practical
matter not all religious teachings can be integrated in the
classroom curriculum. However, if religion per se is excluded
that may undermine the principles of democracy the school
system seeks to further.
Thomas Jefferson found an answer to this dilemma in the
creation of a civil religion. Jefferson agreed that the
divisiveness of sectarian religions would disrupt society unless
privatized. 16 However, without some common public morality
republicanism would fail. 17 Thus, Jefferson advocated the
teaching of a universal religion that would be accepted by all
because the truthfulness of its tenets was self-evident. 18 These
tenets were: "1. That there is one only God, and He all perfect.

14. Arnold Mueller, Religion in the Public Schools, in CHURCH AND STATE
UNDER GoD 300, 301 (1964).
15. ld.
16. SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 83.
17. ld.
18.

ld.
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2. That there is a future state of rewards and punishments. 3.
That to love God with all thy heart and neighbor as thyself, is
the sum of religion." 19 Jefferson further advocated, in
proposing the blueprints for religious study at the University of
Virginia, that a professor of ethics be responsible for teaching
the "proofs of the being of God" and that religious sects be
permitted to use the University's facilities to teach their
doctrine. 20 Jefferson reasoned that "[b]y bringing the sects
together, and mixing them with the mass of other students, we
shall soften their asperities, liberalize and neutralize their
prejudices and make the general religion a religion of peace,
reason, and morality." 21
In effect, Jefferson sought to resolve the problem through
eradicating the divisiveness of the sects by distilling them to
their essence. This essence, Jefferson contended, is what binds
society together. 22 In addition, all religions share this essence
and therefore no one religion is preferred over another. In a
society which, religiously speaking, is fairly homogenous
Jefferson's analysis might ring true. Yet, it is clear there must
be a near unanimous consensus that the tenets are "selfevident" if Jefferson's reasoning is to withstand practical
application. In fact, at least one commentator has suggested
that Jefferson simply advanced his sect, Deism, through
characterizing it in a manner pleasing to the religious palates
of the time. 23
In general, before, during and after the ratification of the
First Amendment, 24 public schools were seen as an
environment friendly to religion. Indeed, religion was viewed as
necessary to accomplish the purpose for which public schools
were organized, whether that be religious inculcation or
societal stability. However, the problems caused by the
plurality's assessment of religion's role in public education, as a
practical matter, were confronted even at a time when society
was much more homogenous than it is today.

19. VETTERU supra note 9, at 102.
20. J. RANDOLPH, EARLY HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA, AS
CONTAINED IN THE LETTERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON AND JOSEPH C. CABELL 441
(1856).
21. P. FORD, ED., THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 12:272 (1892-99).
22. VETTERU, supra note 9, at 102.
23. SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 83-84.
24. Requiring, inter alia, that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion nor prohibiting the free exercise thereof."
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In 1963, the Supreme Court defined the common goal of
the public schools as the "preservation of a democratic system
of government."25 The Court also recognized that sectarianism
is a divisive force capable of impeding the public school
system. 26 Through the incorporation doctrine, the Supreme
Court applies the Establishment Clause to issues of religion
and education in order to prevent the divisiveness of
sectarianism. 27 The Court attempts to do this without diluting
the effectiveness of the public schools to provide for society's
common destiny. They are not always successful.
The Supreme Court, in 1947, declared that the First
Amendment Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses were
applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 28 This has the practical effect of
reshaping the religion/education debate. The primary concern is
no longer whether sectarianism is too divisive or how to best
promote civic virtue. Today's issue is whether or not a public
school's activity "establishes religion" or prohibits the free
exercise of religion. As the cases demonstrate, however, this is
often difficult to resolve given the public school's goal of
promoting a democratic society. One must continually consider
at what point moral tenets become religion rather than simply
a reflection of cultural mores.
Initially, the Supreme Court defmed "establishment" as
any interaction between church and state that breached the
"wall of separation"29 built by the First Amendment. 30 In
Everson the Supreme Court considered whether or not a
statute allowing local school boards to reimburse parents of
children attending both public and parochial schools

25. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); See supra note 1 and surrounding text.
26. Illinois ex. rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948)
(opinion of J. Frankfurter) (stating that "[i]n no activity of the state is it more
vital to keep out divisive forces than the schools) (cited with approval in Edwards
v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987)).
27. Id.
28. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
29. The use of Jefferson's metaphor to exclude religion from the public schools

is somewhat disingenuous. Those who offer this standard for constitutional
interpretation must think Jefferson an incredible hypocrite to support such strict
separation on the federal level and then propose public schools which provide,
perhaps even require religious indoctrination on the state level. For further
discussion see DALLIN H. OAKS, THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE (1963).
30. Everson 330 U.S. at 1.

)

.

..!>,

..,
c(,.

1

'l

.')

94

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[1994

"established" religion. 31 Justice Black writing for the majority
stated:
[t]he "establishment of religion" clause of the First
Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the
Federal government can set up a church. Neither can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person
to go or to remain away from church against his will or force
him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person
can be punished for entertaining or professing religious
beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance.
No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support
any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be
called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice
religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can,
openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious
organizations or groups and vice versa. 32

Despite this emphatic separationist language the Court found
that the New Jersey statute did not violate the Constitution
because the statute was designed to benefit the child rather
than the parochial school. 33
After Everson the Supreme Court maintained a strict
separationist line, holding unconstitutional a program of
release time for religious study in a public school. 34 Four
years later, the Court weakened its hardline approach in
Zorach v. Clauson 35 finding a released-time plan
constitutional when, unlike McCollum, the religious instruction
occurred off the public school grounds. 36 The Court reasoned
that this plan was simply an accommodation of public
schedules to the needs of religious citizens. 37 The importance
of the Court's opinion in Zorach is that it signals the Court's
recognition that a wall may be incapable, in practical
application, of dividing such integrally related spheres as
church and state. The Court, in Zorach, appears to recognize
that the religion clauses, similar to other rights provided in the
Constitution, cannot be applied in an absolute manner. The
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id. at 15-16.
ld.
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
343 U.S. 306 (1952).
Id. at 315.

Id.
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Court was concerned that the religion clauses not be
interpreted in a way hostile to religion. Thus, the Court
introduced an accommodationist approach to the Establishment
Clause that would allow for the proposition that "[w ]e are a
religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being."38
However, the Zorach rationale was construed narrowly in
later cases as the Supreme Court held state prescribed
prayer39 and voluntary Bible reading40 unconstitutional in
the public schools. The Court in Schempp articulated a
definition for establishment which essentially stated that, if
either the purpose or primary effect of the enactment is the
advancement or inhibition of religion, then the enactment is
unconstitutional. 41 Thus, a statute establishes religion if it
has no secular purpose, or if it has the primary effect of
advancing or inhibiting religion. In Lemon v. Kurtzman 42 the
Court reaffirmed this test with an additional condition that the
statute not create excessive entanglement between Church and
State. 43
Until the Lemon test the Supreme Court applied a strict
wall of separation analysis to activities alleged to establish a
religion. The Court reasoned that the "first and most
immediate purpose [of the Establishment Clause] rested on the
belief that a union of government and religion tends to destroy
government and degrade religion."44 However, the Court did
acknowledge, at least in one case, that the principle of
separation was not an independent guideline and the
accommodation of religion did not per se amount to an
establishment of religion. 45 Since Lemon the Court has
maintained a strict separation mentality while measuring
establishment against three standards: 1) is there a secular
purpose for the contested statute? 2) does the statute advance
or inhibit religion? and 3) does the statute cause an excessive
entanglement with religion?

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

!d. at 313.
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1961).
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).

!d. at 222.
403 U.S. 602 (1971).

!d. at 612-613.
Engel, 370 U.S. at 431.
Zorach, 343 U.S. at 312.

.
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Unfortunately, in applying the Lemon test the Court has
often forgotten its goal of preventing an establishment of
religion, consequently creating in the classroom an atmosphere
of hostility and intolerance towards religion. Two primary
problems exist with the Court's application of the Lemon test:
1) the Court assumes that a "secular" purpose is nonreligious
without defining secularism, and 2) the Court assumes that an
advancement, inhibition or entanglement with religion
necessarily establishes religion. A review of court decisions
involving religion and education will illustrate these concems.

III.

.APPLYING THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS.

A.

Classroom Curriculum

The Supreme Court has decided two major cases involving
classroom curriculum; both involve the evolutionary theory of
human origin. In Epperson v. Arkansas 46 the Court held unconstitutional a state statute forbidding instruction in the public schools regarding the theory of evolution. While this case
was decided before the Lemon test was fully developed, the Supreme Court stated that establishment is determined by
whether the primary purpose or effect of the legislation is the
advancement or inhibition of religion. 47
In deciding that the purpose of the Arkansas statute was
religious, the Court failed to define what constitutes religion or
what would make the law secular. The majority's only guidance
is that "there can be no doubt that Arkansas has sought to
prevent its teachers from discussing the theory of evolution
because it is contrary to the belief of some that the Book of
Genesis must be the exclusive source of doctrine as to the origin of man."48 The Court offers no evidence that this is true
except that the law is similar to a Tennessee law that was
couched in more religious language.49 Failure to define the
religion-secularism distinction assumes ipso facto that traditional creation is religious and modem evolution is secular.
As Justice Black points out in his concurring opinion, the
Court has failed to address whether "forbidding a State to

46.
47.
48.
49.

393

u.s.

97 (1968).

ld. at 107.
ld.
ld.
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exclude the subject of evolution from its schools infringes the
religious freedom of those who consider evolution an anti-religious doctrine." 50 In other words, the Court forbids inhibiting
the instruction of evolution, a principle many feel is inapposite
to traditional religion. This, at best, constitutionalizes hostility
toward religion in the public classroom and, at worst, establishes a religion professing evolution over a religion professing
creation. To resolve this conflict the Court must clarify the line
between religion and secularism. Otherwise, the Court, as
Justice Black notes, is "simply ... [writing] off as pure nonsense the views of those who consider evolution an anti-religious doctrine." 51
The religion-secularism distinction is amplified in Edwards
v. Aguillard. 52 In Aguillard the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a Louisiana statute requiring that if evolution is
taught then creation science must also be taught. The Court
followed the Lemon test and inquired whether the legislature
had a valid secular purpose for enacting this law.
The Court failed, however, to explicitly define religion or
secularism. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, explained that a religious intent exists if the legislature promotes
a particular sect or promotes religion in general. 53 This, of
course, begs the question, what is a sect or what is religion in
general. The definition of religion may be found in the evidence
the Court uses to hold that a religious purpose exists.
One item of evidence the Court uses to indict the legislative purpose is the finding that creation science leads one to
the conclusion that a Supreme Creator exists. 54 Thus, one
characteristic of religion may be a belief in the existence of a
Supreme Creator. This cannot be determinative, however, since
the Court did not rule that the teaching of creation science is
per se unconstitutional. 55 Likewise, it contradicts the Court's
earlier rulings that religion does not require a Supreme Creator to invoke First Amendment protection. 56

50. !d. at 113 (Black, J., concurring).
51. !d. at 113.
52. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
53. !d. at 585.
54. !d. at 591-2.
55. !d. at 587.
56. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367
U.S. 488 (1962); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
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The Court also inferred that religious motivation must
exist because historically, certain religions opposed evolution.57 Thus, whether a view is religious may depend on how
history has defined that view. This is a fairly dangerous criteria since it would exclude "modern" religions from constitutional protection. Moreover, it is unhelpful because the Court fails
to expand on what historical criteria are used to distinguish between religious and secular precepts.
Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion, hints at the criteria necessary to define something as secular. He explains that
although "the statute is limited to the scientific evidences supporting the theory [this] does not render its purpose secular.... Whatever the academic merit of particular subjects or
theories, the Establishment Clause limits the discretion of
state officials to pick and choose among them for the purpose of
promoting a particular religious belief."58 Thus, Justice Powell
requires more than scientific evidence to prove something is
secular. Secularism, according to Justice Powell, requires that
the science not be used to promote a particular religious belief.
Yet, there is no real evidence to support that Arkansas used
creation science to support a religious belief.
Justice Powell's reasoning helps to winnow out the contradictions inherent in the Court's approach to the Establishment
Clause in education-related cases. If the Court does not define
what constitutes a religious belief, then a religious belief is
whatever anyone desires. For example, a secular humanist will
find the teaching in public school of any concept which leads to
a belief in a Supreme Creator as unconstitutionally establishing a religion of deism. Likewise, a fundamentalist Christian
will find any teaching which leads to a belief that mortality is
the end of existence as unconstitutionally establishing a religion of atheism.
Clearly, this reasoning survives when applied to the
majority's analysis in Aguillard. The Court in Aguillard finds
that creation-science is offered to promote the belief that a
Supreme Creator exists. This promotion is evident, the Court
reasons, from the background of those who support creationscience and the obvious conclusion that a Supreme Creator
exists which one must infer if creation-science is true. Because
the existence of a Supreme Creator is clearly a religious pre57. Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 591.
58. !d. at 604 (Powell, J., concurring).

l
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cept, the state's support of creation-science to advance this
precept is an establishment of religion. However, one could
invalidate evolution through the same analysis.
Evolution, the argument begins, is offered to promote the
belief that man is alone in the universe. This promotion is
evident from the secular humanists, atheists and agnostics who
support evolution and from the natural conclusion one must
infer if evolution is true. One might object claiming that one
could also conclude that a Supreme Creator through evolution
made the universe. 59 However, this is still a religious belief.
Either way, evolution is used to support a religious tenet.
Again, one might object, explaining that evolution, unlike creation-science, is not provided to support the belief which may
be its logical conclusion. Nonetheless, evolution does support a
religious belief even though it is not intended. Under Lemon an
effect of establishing religion violates the Constitution though
the violator did not intend that effect. 60 Also, the purpose for
teaching evolution would then be to obtain knowledge. Without
guidelines it is unclear why knowledge is a secular pursuit.
Indeed, a major tenet of Christianity is that truth will set one
free. 61 The only difference between evolution and creationism
is that one traditionally has been associated with "religion"
while the other has not. An analysis of lower court decisions
will substantiate this reasoning.
The Sixth Circuit determined that the plaintiff-parents had
no right to remove their children from a program which the
parents viewed as establishing a religion of human secularism.62 In Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education the
plaintiffs are seven families who object to the teaching of material the parents find offensive to their religious beliefs. 63 The
plaintiffs claim that requiring their children to read and discuss literature that promotes evolution, secular humanism,
futuristic supernaturalism, magic and false views of death
violates the First Amendment's free exercise clause. The Court,
applying a standard of coercion, found that absent some re-

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 591 n.11.
ld. at 583.
John 8:32.
Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987).
ld. at 1060-1.
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quirement of acquiescence or participation no violation had occurred.64
It is important to note that in this case, unlike Epperson
and Aguillard, the plaintiffs are claiming a violation of the
First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause and not a violation of
the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. Nonetheless, the
Court rejected a "balancing'' approach to the plaintiffs' dilemma
because this would violate the Establishment Clause. 65 This
reasoning leads to some complex definitional quandaries.
The Sixth Circuit rejected the district court's suggestion
that the school district should balance the "offensive" material
with material which correlates with the parents' views. 66 The
Sixth Circuit presented two reasons for this rejection: 1) the
balance would be impossible, and 2) such a balance would violate the Establishment Clause. 67 The Court reasoned that the
balance would be impossible because the plaintiffs' views included intolerance for any view that undermined plaintiffs'
philosophy. The Court acknowledges, however, that testimony
was presented "that an occasional reference to ... objectionable
concepts would be acceptable."68 It was the repeated and unrefuted references which constituted the plaintiff's contention of
Constitutional violation. 69 Thus, the Court's claim of impossibility is unwarranted.
The Court also worried that any balancing would violate
the Establishment Clause. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that "the
Supreme Court has clearly held that it violates the Establishment Clause to tailor a public school's curriculum to satisfy the
principles or prohibitions of any religion." 70 The Court fails to
define what constitutes religion. Conceivably, the plaintiffs felt
that secularism, supernaturalism and the other "isms" were
religions. Surely, the Establishment Clause cannot be read to
allow "tailoring" to one set of religions while excluding another
set. It is highly ironic that the courts forbid the mention of
Christianity in a textbook in order to counterbalance the repetitious references to other religions because to do so "would lead

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1063-4.
at 1064-5.

at 1064.
(quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968).
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to a forbidden entanglement of the public schools in religious
matters.'m The Sixth Circuit is not alone in its schizophrenia.
The Seventh Circuit has forbidden the teaching of creationscience as a violation of the Establishment Clause. 72 In Webster v. New Lenox School District the plaintiff was a school
teacher who countered the teaching of evolution with the teaching of creation science. Some students objected to this as a
violation of the Establishment Clause. The school district superintendent relied on Aguillard and directed the plaintiff, Ray
Webster, to cease teaching creation-science because the "teaching of this theory had been held by the federal courts to be
religious advocacy."73 Mr. Webster brought suit claiming censorship under the First Amendment. 74 While it is not clear
whether the plaintiff raised the issue of establishment, the
Court clearly accepts as legitimate the superintendent's professed concern that the plaintiffs actions violate the Establishment Clause.
The Seventh Circuit concludes that, "[e]ducators do not
offend the First Amendment ... so long as their actions are
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."75 The
pedagogical concern is that Mr. Webster's subject matter created Establishment Clause violations. 76 The Court failed to explain how Mr. Webster's actions established a religion. Mr.
Webster's stated reason for teaching creation-science was to
"explore alternative viewpoints."77 The Court failed to offer
any criteria for distinguishing a religious viewpoint from a secular one. The Court simply held that "the school board has
successfully navigated the narrow channel between impairing
intellectual inquiry and propagating a religious creed."78
There is no explanation of how evidence indicating that the
Earth is not four billion years old establishes a religious creed.
Likewise, there is no explanation of why evidence propagating
the evolution of man is considered secular. The definitional
problems the Webster case illustrates are even more salient

71. Id. at 1065.
72. Webster v. New Lenox Sch. Dist. No. 122, 917 F.2d 1004 (7th Cir. 1990).
73. Id. at 1006 (footnote omitted).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1008 (quoting Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,
27 (1988).
76. ld.
77. Id. at 1006.
78. Id. at 1008.
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when compared with Moore v. Gaston County Board of Education79
In Moore, the plaintiff, a student teacher, was fired for
expressing his belief that, inter alia, evolution was a valid
theory, God did not exist, nor did heaven or hell, and that certain parts of the Bible could not be taken literally. 80 The District Court held that "[ t]o discharge a teacher without warning
because his answers to scientific and theological questions do
not fit the notions of the local parents and teachers is a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. It is
an 'establishment of religion,' the official approval of local orthodoxy . . . "81 The Court reasoned that allowing the teacher
to respond in a manner which comports with those who "complain the loudest" establishes the religion of those complainants.82
The Court failed to adequately address what constitutes
religion. The Court indicated that religion is that sphere of life
which cannot be proved and therefore requires one to walk by
faith. 83 This is a frail standard by which to judge between the
religious and the secular. There are times when science requires belief in what is not proven. 84 Additionally, there are
myriad instances of "proven" principles being disproved, 85
thus one can rarely know when something is actually proven.
Even accepting this as a valid distinction, plaintiff's statements
made in class cannot be proven, all require faith and therefore
are, according to the Court, religious dogma. Remarkably, the
Court allows the teacher to discuss personal religious views,
religious views so offensive to some students that the students
actually tried to walk out during the discussion. 86 Either the
Court is advocating that teachers be permitted to discuss religious principles at least when interrogated regarding those
principles, or the Court is asserting that the plaintiffs views

79. 357 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D.N.C. 1973).
80. !d. at 1038.
81. !d. at 1043.
82. !d.
83. !d.
84. Evolution between species is one example. Science has yet to find the
"missing link."
85. Blood-letting as a way to cure disease, the finding of Eve see Begley, Eve
Takes Another Fall, NEWSWEEK, March 2, 1992, at 58, the make-up of the smallest
particle and the big-bang theory are also examples of proven scientific principles
eroding under further study.
86. !d. at 1038.
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are non-religious and as in Mozert the school district cannot
proscribe conduct simply because it is offensive.
Given the court's concern that, "[r]eligious or scientific
dogma supported by the power of the state has historically
brought threat to liberty and often death to the unorthodox ...
"it is safe to assume that the Court did not feel Mr. Webster's
views were religious in nature. The Court can reach this conclusion because they reason from the premise that Mr.
Webster's comments amounted to little more than inferences
from Darwin's theory of evolution and to postpone regarding
this theory is to postpone education. 87 The Court assumes that
Mr. Webster's statements are not religious without explaining
why. An analysis of the Bible reading cases further illustrates
the definitional dilemma arising from the Court's application of
the Establishment Clause to public schools has caused.

B. Bible Reading
One of the earliest Supreme Court cases applying the Establishment Clause to Bible reading activities is School District
of Abington Township v. Schempp. 88 In Schempp the Court
consolidated two cases in which the states passed laws requiring Bible reading at the start of each day. 89 Attendance at the
Bible reading sessions was not mandatory, the children took
turns reading from any version of the Bible they chose, there
were no comments made, no questions asked and no explanations given. 90 The states also required recitation of the Lord's
prayer at the beginning of each day, though attendance was not
mandatory. 91 Plaintiffs objected to this exercise claiming it
violated the First Amendment. 92
The Court held that this practice did indeed violate the
First Amendment's Establishment Clause. The Court reasoned
that while state power cannot be used to handicap religion, the
First Amendment requires abstention "from fusing functions of
Government and of religious sects."93 Additionally, the Court
explained that "the place of the Bible as an instrument of reli87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
203, 227

!d.
374 U.S. 203 (1963).
!d. at 205.
ld. at 207.
ld.
ld.
ld. at 219 (quoting Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S.
(1948).
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gion cannot be gainsaid," thus concluding that this exercise was
religious in nature and constituted an establishment of religion
in violation of the First Amendment. 94
The Court again failed to define religion. The Supreme
Court concluded that reading the Bible itself was not violative
of the First Amendment, and in fact the Court said, "the Bible
is worthy of study" for secular purposes. 95 Additionally, the
secular goals set out by defendants, "promotion of moral values,
the contradiction to the materialistic trends of our times, the
perpetuation of our institutions and the teaching of literature,"
were not found to be religious. 96 Thus, if reading the Bible is
constitutional and studying morals is constitutional, one can
only conclude that what is unconstitutional about these exercises is the use of the Bible to promote morals.
The Court concluded that "even if its purpose is not strictly
religious, it is sought to be accomplished through readings,
without comment, from the Bible."97 Moreover, Justice
Brennan adds, referring to the secular purposes served through
these exercises, "it would seem that less sensitive materials
might equally well serve the same purpose." 98 Justice
Brennan concluded that the First Amendment forbids "the use
of religious means to achieve secular ends where nonreligious
means will suffice."99 Justice Brennan even suggests that "less
sensitive means" might be found in speeches and messages of
great Americans. 100
What the majority and Justice Brennan fail to explain is
why these means are less sensitive. For example, one might
use the Declaration of Independence in order to promote morals. Yet, Jefferson, in this great writing, assumes that inalienable rights are endowed by a "creator." Surely those who seek a
"complete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious

94. !d. at 223-4.
95. !d. at 225.
96. !d. at 223-224.
97. !d. at 224. The Court adds that allowing nonattendance and the use of
different versions of the Bible contradicts any professed secular purpose. The Court
fails to explain this reasoning. It would seem that the state is simply acknowledg·
ing that different versions of the Bible also contain moral teachings and literary
value, and that some may be offended by these teachings and thus are entitled to
absent themselves.
98. !d. at 280 (Brennan, J., concurring).
99. !d. at 280-1.
100. !d.
i

87]

ALIENATION FROM PUBLIC SCHOOLS

105

activity and civil authority" 101 would object to Jefferson's supposition. If one looks at the speeches and messages of great
Americans reference to a god or supreme creator are pervasive.102
The Court similarly failed to explain why using the philosophy of a great American to promote morals is not religion but
using the Bible for the same purpose establishes religion. Some
will disagree regarding the influence or legitimacy of any historical figure's personal beliefs. If the school requires the study
of these beliefs to promote morals and contradict the materialism of our times, one may question whether this constitutes
"indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform
to the prevailing officially approved religion?" 103 This question is impossible to answer when the Court fails to define
religion. This contradiction is shown again in Wallace v.
Jaffree 104 in which the Court found unconstitutional a statute
allowing voluntary prayer in the public schools.

C.

School Prayer

In Lee v. Weisman 105 the Court held that graduation
prayers directed by state officials violated the Establishment
Clause. The majority found that the government involvement
in religion was pervasive and that the students were forced to
submit to subtle coercive pressure. 106 The Court displayed the
type of thinking which leads one to believe that the Court either draws its definition of religion too narrowly or fails to
define religion at all.
The Court expressed sympathy for a civic religion but balanced that against the principle that "all creeds must be tolerated and none favored." 107 The Court's analysis sounds good
but does not work in practice. One can argue coherently that
"nonprayer" and "nonreligion" are creeds and are favored over
traditional creeds. The Court states that graduation is "one of
life's most significant occasions" 108 and that the students are

101.
102.
103.
(1962)).
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

ld. at 217 (citing Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1947).
See supra note 9 and surrounding text.
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 221 (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430-1
472 U.S. 38 (1985).
120 L. Ed. 2d 467 (1992).
ld. at 480, 484.
ld. at 482-483.
ld. at 486.
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susceptible to the psychological coercion inherent in maintaining respectful silence. 109 Yet, the Court, apparently, believes
that proscribing prayer at a graduation ceremony does not send
a message to these students that creeds which engage in
prayer are not to be tolerated. The court simply cannot have it
both ways. If students feel this ceremony is one of life's most
significant occasions, then clearly they will wonder why religion, an otherwise significant portion of their lives, is affirmatively excluded. Moreover, if students are susceptible to the
psychological coercion of something as cordial as maintaining
respectful silence, they will obviously be susceptible to the
direct coercion of an affirmative ban of such a universal symbol
of religion such as prayer.
The Court's quandary is highlighted when it tries to explain why students may be "subjected during the course of
their educations to ideas deemed offensive and irreligious, but
[are] denied a brief, formal prayer ceremony that the school
offers in return." 110 The Court points out that this conflict
confuses the speech and religion clauses of the First Amendment.111 The Court concludes that "[t]he explanation lies in
the lesson of history that was and is the inspiration for the
Establishment Clause, the lesson that in the hands of government what might begin as a tolerant expression of religious
views may end in a policy to indoctrinate and coerce."112
What the Court fails, or refuses, to realize is that history also
clearly teaches that in the hands of government what might
begin as a tolerant expression of ANY view may end in a policy
to indoctrinate and coerce. 113
In Wallace, an Alabama statute authorizing the public
school teachers to hold a one-minute period of silence for meditation was amended to include "for meditation or voluntary
prayer." 114 The Court ruled that the addition of the term "voluntary prayer" clearly had the religious purpose of advancing

109. !d. at 484.
110. !d. at 483.
111. /d. The court fails to explain why irreligious ideas, which clearly incorporate atheism, are nonreligious. The mere fact that someone is amoral does not
mean the person has no moral philosophy.
112. !d.
113. A few examples will suffice, the French Revolution, the words of Karl
Marx, and the reigns of Lenin, Stalin and Hitler.
114. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 40.
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prayer in the public schools. 115 The Court reasoned that the
term "meditation" includes prayer and thus the addition of the
term "voluntary prayer" is either unnecessary or added for the
purpose of endorsing religion. 116 The Court invalidated a
third alternative, that the term "voluntary prayer" was added
to accommodate the free exercise of religious beliefs, because
there existed no burden prohibiting the exercise of such beliefs.
This reasoning ignores the acknowledgment made by the Court
that "for some persons meditation itself may be a form of
prayer." 117 Thus, the addition of "voluntary prayer" may have
been added to clarify any misperception regarding whether or
not traditional forms of prayer were permissible. In other
words, the statute was meant to remove a perceived burden.118
Regardless of the purpose behind the term "voluntary
prayer" the Court is hypocritical in its definitions of religion.
Clearly, the Court ruled that a state cannot set aside a moment
of silence for the stated purpose of prayer. This, the Court
reasoned, endorses prayer. 119 However, the Court concludes
that "[w ]e do not imply that simple meditation or silence is
barred from the public schools; we simply hold that the state
cannot participate in the advancement of religious activities in
any guise." 120 The Court's inference is that the term prayer
connotes religion but the term meditation or silence does not.
The term "prayer" added to this statute presumably pushed
children toward prayer. Incredibly, the term meditation does
not appear to push a student toward meditation, although the
Court acknowledged that meditation is a type of prayer.
Even a moment of silence arguably encourages children to
meditate or pray. Justice O'Connor suggests that a moment of
silence is not inherently religious because a child is not required to join in the prayer and the child is left to his or her
own thoughts. 121 However, one could reasonably argue that
requiring children to be silent is endorsing meditation-an activity that can be characterized as religious. Even if it were true
that a moment of silence does not establish religious activities
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.

at 59-60.
at
at
at
at
at

59 n.47.
87 (Burger, J., dissenting).
60.
48 n.30.
72-3 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

..'

108

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[1994

because one is not forced or encouraged to participate, this is
also true of a moment of silent prayer. The Court has defined
prayer as religious probably because society traditionally considers prayer a religious activity. Yet, the Court defines meditation and a "moment of silence" as secular even though today
both serve the functions of traditional prayer.
In each of the above cases the Court, as in the days of
Jefferson and Mann, confronts religion as an obstacle to the
effective facilitation of the public school system. Yet, the Court,
rather than seeking some common ground as Jefferson and
Mann sought, has striven to completely exclude religion from
the public school arena.

D.

Incorporation Doctrine

One might attempt to explain these different approaches to
the same problem in terms of the incorporation doctrine. In
other words, Jefferson and Mann did not have the First
Amendment mandating a "wall of separation" between church
and state because the Fourteenth Amendment either was unavailable or had not yet been interpreted to "incorporate" the
First Amendment, thus, making the First Amendment applicable to the states. Since this "incorporation" the Court has been
much more absolute in its rejection of religious precepts in the
public schools. The incorporation reasoning alone, however,
does not provide an entirely satisfactory explanation for the
Court's almost universal rejection of religion in the public
school setting.
While the incorporation doctrine adds a new twist to an old
debate, it need not completely eradicate the usefulness of historical references. Historical references provide evidences that
the Establishment Clause has not been interpreted to preclude
religion from all aspects of publi.c life. For example, in
Bradfield v. Roberts 122 the Supreme Court held that a federal
government contract with the Catholic Sisters of Charity to run
a hospital did not violate the Establishment Clause. However,
the Court has struck down as violative of the Establishment
Clause statutes that provided supplements for the salaries of
teachers of secular subjects in nonpublic elementary

122. 175

u.s.

291 (1899).
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schools. 123 The distinction between these two cases cannot be
explained by reference to the Establishment Clause.
Moreover, it cannot reasonably be argued that the ratifiers
expected the Establishment Clause to mean that religion and
the public classroom must be completely bifurcated, especially
given the pervading notion that religion was necessary to the
advancement of civil society. The First Congress, it should be
remembered, passed the Northwest Ordinance indicating that a
relationship between religion and schools was acceptable in the
same session they passed the Bill of Rights containing the
Establishment Clause language. Additionally, the First Congress passed a law requiring the opening of Congress with an
invocation. By analogy, it borders on the inane to argue that
the Establishment Clause is intended to eradicate all aspects of
religion from public life. Thus, the question once again becomes
"when does an establishment of religion take place?''
The ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment, through which
the First Amendment became applicable to the states, enjoyed
many of the activities in public schools, prayer, Bible reading
and religious oriented instruction, that today's courts have
found to violate the Establishment Clause. The question remains, why does modern society interpret the Establishment
Clause to require absolute separation of religion and the classroom? While analyzing modern thought as reflected in case
law, one must look beyond the Establishment Clause application to the Establishment Clause interpretation and how and
why that differs with historical perspectives.
In fact, a closer look at the Court's decisions reveals that
they are not much different from the approach Jefferson and
Mann espoused. In essence, Jefferson articulated universal
principles of a religious nature and labeled them non-sectarian.
Today, the Court chooses those virtues not necessary to the
success of public education and labels them religious. The Establishment Clause is a tool that can be used to issue decrees
on what is and is not appropriate for public school curriculum.
The problem, of course, is that this no longer resolves the dilemma of whose religion receives airtime in the public schools.
Society has become so pluralistic that universal precepts are no
longer self-evident. Therefore, alienation is inevitable.

123. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

The preceding sections display an incredible dilemma.
Public schools are necessary to promote cultural adhesion and
foster individual growth, thus creating a more productive society. Moreover, the schools want and need to promote a free
market-place of ideas. Morals or values are a fundamental part
of any culture and are necessary to the well-being of the individuals within that culture. Yet, parents entrust their children
to the schools with the understanding that the schools will not
promote values inconsistent with those of the parents. Additionally, the schools must be careful not to violate the Establishment and Free Exercise clauses of the First Amendment,
which protect all individuals from invasions upon the freedom
of conscience. 124 Thus, to effectively accomplish their purpose
the schools must articulate morals and values consistent with
the cultural goals of the school and yet not violate the First
Amendment. The courts can overcome this dilemma in four
ways: 1) define religion in a universally acceptable way, 2)
overtum the incorporation doctrine and allow the states more
flexibility, 3) define those values necessary to the culture as
non-religious, or 4) define "establishment" as something more
than mere presentation, thus allowing a wider variety of morals and viewpoints to be taught.
The first and second options are unlikely to occur in the
near future. The definition of religion is clearly cultural and
the culture is in a state of continuous flux. Consequently, even
assuming a definition could be articulated, it would likely be
brittle and shatter when held against the changing tide of
societal norms. Overturning the incorporation doctrine would
be difficult because it has been a part of American jurisprudence and American culture for such a long time. Should the
Court seek to advance this goal, it would allow the states more
control and promote greater cultural commitment. The danger
in this approach is that minority religious views would be subject to the whim of the majority.
The third option is the one the courts have chosen as exemplified throughout this paper. Justice O'Connor articulates
this point well when she states,

124. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 39 (1985).
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it is inevitable that the secular interests of government and
the religious interests of various sects and their adherents
will frequently intersect, conflict and combine .... Chaos
would ensue if every such statute were invalid under the
Establishment Clause. For example, the State could not
criminalize murder for fear that it would thereby promote the
Biblical command against killing." 125

What Justice O'Connor and the courts have refused to acknowledge is that the only reason the biblical command against killing does not violate the Establishment Clause is because, on a
fundamental level, unjustified homicide breaches virtually
everyone's moral code. Thus, no one complains that religion has
been established. This is similar to Jefferson's approach to
divisive sects-find some principle upon which the sects will not
divide.
The problem of defining a precept as non-religious is that
eventually the definer steps outside the universal moral code,
someone disagrees and then uses the First Amendment to have
the precept excluded from public discourse. Today, that universal moral code contains fewer and fewer shared precepts, increasing the likelihood that the definer will step into the realm
of the offensive. A societal alienation is inevitable.
This alienation occurs because whoever defines the values
necessary to the culture, labels those values "non-religious"
providing those values with access to the public domain. However, those values labeled "religious" are excluded from the
public domain and thus values necessary to specific segments
of the population may be excluded. This alienates those segments, inevitably reshaping society's cultural makeup. As Justice Clark explained, "[ w ]hen government, ... allies itself with
one particular form of religion the inevitable result is that it
incurs 'the hatred, disrespect and even contempt of those who
held contrary beliefs."' 126 Aside from alienation, labeling certain morals or methods as religious and thus excluding them
also results in intolerance and a restriction of the free-marketplace of ideas that is necessary to public schools.
The Court, in refining the purpose of the First Amendment
religion clause, explains that "the political interest in forestalling intolerance extends beyond intolerance among Christian
125. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 69-70 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
126. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 221-2 (quoting Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431
(1962).
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sects-or even intolerance among 'religions'-to encompass
intolerance of the disbeliever and the uncertain." 127 Yet, the
Court has repeatedly been intolerant of traditional, religious
views, presented in any form in the public schools. Consequently, those who follow traditionally defined religions are excluded,
in the name of tolerance, while the hesitant and uncertain are
permitted to preach or at least share their doubt with children
in the public schools, all the while demanding the exclusion of
traditional religion.
Intolerance towards traditional, religious views is reflected
in the moral breakdown occurring throughout the nation. According to the National Crime Survey, almost three million
crimes occur on or near school campuses every year. 128 Onefourth of major urban school districts now use metal
detectors. 129 Almost one-third of the students in 31 high
schools in Illinois said they had brought a weapon to school for
self-protection at some time during their high school career.130 One in twenty said they had brought a gun. 131
Clearly, the above statistics reflect a lessening respect for life
and property which is a primary Judea-Christian value. One
look at the pervasiveness of drug use, teenage pregnancy, or
political corruption and one can sense the result of an increasing intolerance for traditional values such as respect for one's
body, abstinence, and honesty.
Some might claim that the courts are only alienating the
intolerant, and, by definition, a tolerant society will necessarily
eliminate or alienate such a segment of its population. However, while it is true intolerant people exist, it can hardly be said
those who request that creation-science be taught when evolution is taught, or that the Bible be used as a source of moral
reference when other books are so used, or that a moment be
permitted for prayer when a moment is permitted for meditation are intolerant fanatics. Those who attempt to exclude such
practices are closing the free-market on ideas that have influenced history and still continue to pervade society.

127.
128.
1992, at
129.

Wallace, 472 U.S. at 54.

Tom Morganthau et al., It's Not Just New York, Newsweek, March 9,
25.
ld.
130. ld.
131. ld.
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America's classrooms are propounded as free-markets
where ideas can be explored, compared, and bartered. Yet,
those who follow traditional religions are told to check their
ideas at the schoolhouse door. This, in effect, closes the door on
examination of the bedrock principles that caused the founding
fathers to act. In philosophical, political, and literary discussions, students and teachers should be permitted to refer to
traditional, religious viewpoints for understanding and instruction. These viewpoints pervade history and many modern communities throughout America. When these views are excluded,
students are denied an opportunity to understand what makes
their world work. This is not an apology for the teaching of
religious doctrine in the classroom. It is a call for freedom to
compete. Many ideas involving societal structure involve religiously oriented suppositions, for example, the idea that "we
are endowed by our Creator with certain inalienable rights."
Communities that value these ideas should be permitted to
present them to their children. Under the current approach to
the Establishment Clause, they cannot.
The fourth option, redefining establishment, would prohibit
the courts from intervening until the violation was more harmful, thus allowing local communities to work out their value
systems and the way those values are presented in public
schools. For example, the mere presentation or existence of a
religious view should not violate the First Amendment. A single comparison of the Establishment Clause and the Free
Speech Clause will illustrate. Justice Jackson has stated that
"[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation it
is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by work or act their faith
therein." 132 The Court has ruled that funding certain political
speech does not violate the First Amendment. 133 If funding
political speech does not "prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics," then funding religious speech does not dictate what
shall be orthodox in religion. 134

132, Board of Educ. v, Barnette, 319 U,S, 624, 642 (1943).
133, Buckley v, Valeo, 424 U.S, 1 (1976).
134, For further comparison of Freedom of Speech jurisprudence and freedom
of religion jurisprudence see Michael W, McConnell, Political and Religious Disestablishment, 1986 BYU. L, REV. 405,
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Returning some control of the definition of religion to local
communities is a desired result because it promotes cultural
adhesion. This would allow a definition of religion according to
values indigenous to a particular community. There is a reason
people may choose to live in Boise, Idaho over Harlem, New
York or vice versa. Individuals will gravitate towards areas
where values most closely resemble their own. Perhaps some
school districts will resolve to exclude religion in a manner
consistent with the last thirty years of Supreme Court decisions. If so, it will be because the community has made that
decision, not because the decision was forced upon them by five
people in Washington D.C. Thus, alienation will be less likely
and community adhesion will be more probable. Compare this
outcome with that of an Afro-centric curriculum. If people have
a right to control their cultural destiny, they should likewise
have the right to control their moral destiny.
The short-coming with returning control to the local level
is that individuals within communities may be alienated. This
is the precise result the Bill of Rights was intended to prevent.
However, the individuals need not feel alienated. The Courts
could still enjoin coercion. Individuals would still be free to
worship (or not worship) how they pleased. The only people
truly excluded are those who are intolerant of the community's
values. Society permits this type of exclusion, else a criminal
justice system would be non-existent, and the civil rights movement would have been impossible. History shows that such a
result would not promote intolerance. For examples one need
look no further than the disestablishment movement in the
states during the early nineteenth century or the evolution
towards non-sectarian schools in the mid-nineteenth century,
all of which occurred without the help of the Establishment
Clause and the Supreme Court.

V.

CONCLUSION

In failing to provide a concrete definition of the terms "religion" and "secular," the courts are free to conclude that in public schools a person may not teach evidence substantiating the
traditionally religious view of a Supreme Creator, but one may
teach a world-view that excludes the existence of a Supreme
Creator or an after-life. Likewise, the courts are free to conclude that the legislature may not proscribe a theory that humankind evolved from an amoeba, but neither may the legislature balance such instruction with evidence which supports the
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traditionally religious view of a Supreme Creator. Moreover,
this vague approach permits the courts to reason that forbidding the view that mortality is the end of existence violates
academic freedom and "postpones education," whereas permitting views which depend on the existence of eternity is unconstitutional.
Admittedly, religious instruction as well as the definition
of religion are at once pervasive and personal. For this reason
it is imperative that the paradox regarding religious instruction
in public schools be resolved, to some extent, on the local level
where a consensus can be reached and community values can
be preserved. If a change occurs, it is a change the community
chooses rather than a change externally imposed. To do otherwise eviscerates the meaning of "community."

